Reviewer first-launch environment, Keychain state and signing facts
Parent: Apple Platform Publishing (Mac App Store) · Topic entry · 16 branches · skill apple-platform-publishing/references/mac-appstore-reviewer-env-keychain-signing.md
A published reference is not available for this topic yet.
Children
- Attribute-only Keychain presence checks (kSecReturnAttributes) versus data reads: which calls need ACL or unlock authori (frontier)
- securityd unlock queries and the client "user interaction allowed" flag: why the flag did not reach the unlock path (frontier)
- SecurityAgent dialogs left behind by dead clients: respawn behaviour and safe cleanup in tests (frontier)
- Fresh macOS account and VM first-login Keychain creation (loginwindow, sysadminctl, auto-login images) (frontier)
- Data-protection keychain read and add inside a TestFlight-delivered Mac sandbox (frontier)
- Gatekeeper and AMFI behaviour for a locally installed Apple Distribution app with a Mac App Store profile and no receipt (frontier)
- TestFlight internal testing for Mac builds: first-launch dialogs, 90-day expiry, signing identity (frontier)
- App Store Connect builds and buildUploads REST resources: processingState, buildProcessingState, qcState, processingErro (frontier)
- Transporter 1.4.5 log layout and the swinfo package analysis step (frontier)
- altool --build-status and --output-format json for a CI-style upload gate (frontier)
- App Review reviewer device OS: public release versus seed, and how rejection messages report it (frontier)
- 2.4.5(viii) and 2.5.1 enforcement on deprecated public Security symbols versus removed frameworks (frontier)
- Python text and .pyc string scanning by the App Store upload scan (itms-services precedent) (frontier)
- Required-reason API privacy manifests for macOS bundles (scope text names only iOS, iPadOS, tvOS, visionOS, watchOS) (frontier)
- Build-path and username leakage in py2app PythonInfoDict (frontier)
- Lazy credential reads behind a consent gate in a store build (5.1.2(i)) (frontier)
Frontier under this node: 2.4.5(viii) and 2.5.1 enforcement on deprecated public Security symbols versus removed frameworks, App Review reviewer device OS: public release versus seed, and how rejection messages report it, App Store Connect builds and buildUploads REST resources: processingState, buildProcessingState, qcState, processingErro, Attribute-only Keychain presence checks (kSecReturnAttributes) versus data reads: which calls need ACL or unlock authori, Build-path and username leakage in py2app PythonInfoDict, Data-protection keychain read and add inside a TestFlight-delivered Mac sandbox, Fresh macOS account and VM first-login Keychain creation (loginwindow, sysadminctl, auto-login images), Gatekeeper and AMFI behaviour for a locally installed Apple Distribution app with a Mac App Store profile and no receipt, Lazy credential reads behind a consent gate in a store build (5.1.2(i)), Python text and .pyc string scanning by the App Store upload scan (itms-services precedent), Required-reason API privacy manifests for macOS bundles (scope text names only iOS, iPadOS, tvOS, visionOS, watchOS), SecurityAgent dialogs left behind by dead clients: respawn behaviour and safe cleanup in tests, TestFlight internal testing for Mac builds: first-launch dialogs, 90-day expiry, signing identity, Transporter 1.4.5 log layout and the swinfo package analysis step, altool --build-status and --output-format json for a CI-style upload gate, securityd unlock queries and the client "user interaction allowed" flag: why the flag did not reach the unlock path